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Abstract—This paper opts to mitigate the energy-inefficiency of the Blockchain Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus algorithm by rationally
repurposing the power spent during the mining process. The original PoW mining scheme is designed to consider one block at a time
and assign a reward to the first place winner of a computation race. To reduce the mining-related energy consumption, we propose to
compensate the computation effort of the runner(s)-up of a mining round, by granting them exclusivity of solving the upcoming block in
the next round. This will considerably reduce the number of competing nodes in the next round and consequently, the consumed
energy. Our proposed scheme divides time into epochs, where each comprises two mining rounds; in the first one, all network nodes
can participate in the mining process, whereas in the second round only runners-up can take part. Thus, the overall mining energy
consumption can be reduced to nearly 50%. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed scheme is the first to considerably improve the
energy consumption of the original PoW algorithm. Our analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of our scheme in reducing energy
consumption, the probability of fork occurrences, the level of mining centralization presented in the original PoW algorithm, and the
effect of transaction censorship attack.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Consensus algorithm, Proof-of-Work, Energy-efficiency.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Nakamoto’s Blockchain protocol [1], also known as proof
of work (PoW), is the first to achieve consensus in a
permission-less setting, where anyone can join or leave
during the protocol execution. Its main security design
goal is to prevent Sybil attacks by relying on a computa-
tional cryptographic puzzle-solving process. The protocol
has proven its robustness since its first application (Bit-
coin) in 2009. However, besides being the most trusted and
secure public consensus algorithm, PoW is considered as a
computation-intensive voting-based consensus process. For
instance, PoW-powered Bitcoin mining consumes massive
power that could suffice for a small country, like Denmark
[2]. Moreover, as estimated by Digiconomist [3], Bitcoin us-
age emits about 33.5 MtCO2e annually, as of May 2018. The
main reason behind the PoW excessive energy is to make
attacks against the blockchain network very expensive.
In a nutshell, PoW is a leader election protocol that
designates among network participants (miners) one leader
that will append the next block to the chain. To attract more
participants to join and maintain the network, and at the
same time demotivate them from cheating, an honest miner
can be elected to receive a very attractive reward if it can
solve a computationally arduous puzzle. The idea behind
making a difficult puzzle in PoW consensus algorithm is to
bound the economic capacity of an adversary to successfully
• N. Lasla, L. S. Alsahan and M. Abdallah are with the Division of Infor-
mation and Computing Technology, College of Science and Engineering,
Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU), Doha, Qatar.
E-mail: {nlasla, lialsahan, mabdallah}@hbku.edu.qa
• Mohamed Younis is with University of Maryland, Baltimore County,
Baltimore, MD, USA.
Email: younis@umbc.edu
Manuscript received ; revised .
undermine the network, for instance, to prevent double
spending attack and rewriting the block-history [4], [5].
Bounding the capacity of users based on their computation
(energy) is only a sufficient condition to prevent security
attacks and not necessary. In the literature, there have been
several attempts to rationalize the consumed energy in
PoW by either bounding the miner economic capacity using
alternative more energy-efficient mechanisms [6], [7], [8],
or by recycling the wasted energy spent in solving the
puzzle to also serve for other useful tasks [9]. However, such
rationalization still cannot meet the same security level as
the original PoW. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [6], [10], for instance,
is a greener form of distributed consensus where validators
(akin to miners) do not have to use their computation power
but only proof the ownership of an amount of stake (bond)
in order to vote on new blocks. Such an approach suffers
from a Nothing-at-Stake problem, where validators can
stake for different blocks supporting multiple forks in order
to maximize their chances of winning a reward [11]. Some
advanced PoS implementations to overcome the Nothing-
at-Stake problem, such as Casper [12], are still in the testing
stage and not yet deployed in large scale networks.
In this paper, we propose a new consensus algorithm
that rationalizes the computational overhead of the original
PoW and reduces its overall energy consumption to nearly
50% without degrading its security level. The main idea is
to factor the power spent during one mining round, in not
only electing which node will write the current mining block
but also selecting a small subset of miners M′ that will be
allotted exclusivity to mine in the next round (power-save
round). Therefore, we modify the original mining scheme by
defining a new participation rule in a mining race. Unlike
the original PoW, the race in the next round will be among
only a small subset of minersM′, and thus less energy will
2be consumed. The other miners keep waiting until the block
gets created before resuming again the mining process.
Because only a small subset of miners will participate in
a power-save round, it is possible that a deadlock happens
if the involved |M′| miners fail to generate the block. This
may occur, for instance, if the miners inM′ get disconnected
from the network. To ensure liveness and avoid such a
situation, we introduce a time-out after each normal race
round. If the nodes that are not participating in the mining
during a power-save round, do not receive a new block
after a specific period of time, they automatically resume
the mining in order to create the missing block.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follow:
• In order to reduce the energy consumption in PoW,
Green-PoW considers mining rounds in pairs and
adjusts the election mechanism during the first min-
ing round in the pair, to allow the election of a
small subset of miners that will exclusively mine
in the second round. Assuming the total network
hashing power is equally distributed among miners,
a significant energy saving up to 50% could thus be
achieved.
• Given that only a small subset of miners can partic-
ipate in the even-numbered mining rounds, Green-
PoW reduces the probability of fork occurrences.
Therefore, the total fork occurrence will be con-
siderably decreased compared to the original PoW
algorithm.
• Green-PoW can help in reducing the level of mining
centralization presented in PoW. This kind of cen-
tralization can happen when a small portion of the
miners, e.g., mining pools in the case of Bitcoin, holds
the majority of the network hash-rate. In Green-PoW,
a winner during the first round cannot participate in
the second round mining, thus miners that hold the
majority of the network hash-rate will no longer have
the same potential for dominating block generation.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of Green-PoW al-
gorithm in reducing the overall energy consumption,
during mining, by conducting a stochastic analysis
where the mining is modeled as a Poisson process.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews the existing work to improve the energy
consumption in PoW. Preliminaries about mining in PoW
are presented in Section 3. The detailed description of our
proposed consensus algorithm can be found in Section 4.
Section 5 analyzes the security properties and reports the
performance results of Green-PoW. Finally the paper is
concluded in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we survey studies made so far in order
to mitigate the energy-inefficiency of the PoW algorithm.
There are two main categories of solutions. In the first
category, the goal is to improve the energy usage of the
original PoW by either recycling the power spent during the
mining process in serving other useful real problems rather
than solving a useless puzzle or modifying the consensus
protocol flow while maintaining the cryptographic puzzle
element unchanged. On the other hand, the second category
follows completely different and consensus algorithms such
as Proof of Stake (PoS) [6], Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET)
[7], and Proof of Retrievability (PoR) [8]. While this class
of solutions can achieve considerable energy saving, yet
it cannot reach the same security level as the well tested
PoW. Our proposed Green-PoW consensus mechanism can
be classified in the first category of solutions, which aims
to improve the energy consumption of PoW. Therefore, the
focus in this section is on setting Green-PoW apart from
competing in such a category.
REM [9] replaces the wasted computations in perform-
ing the conventional PoW by executing useful workloads
outsourced by clients. REM relies on the availability of
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology at the miners’
infrastructure, where a trusted execution environment is
utilized to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of the
workload. Miners get rewarded based on the number of
instructions they can process successfully. However, REM
falls short in overcoming the centralized nature of the
SGX attestation process where accessing Intel’s server is
mandatory in order to validate clients’ workloads. Unlike
REM, A. Shoker [13] and S. King [14] have proposed two
distinct schemes that invest the mining effort to solve public
problems that do not require confidentiality. Examples of the
considered public problems include the generation of large
prime numbers and performing complex matrix operations.
In both schemes, the difficulty of solving a public problem
can be adjusted, which allows it to be an appropriate re-
placement for the hashing processes done by the traditional
PoW. However, the aforementioned schemes cover only a
predefined set of problems which limits the utility of the
processed workload.
Following a similar approach, Felipe et al. [15] have
presented a proof-of-learning consensus mechanism that
substitutes the PoW puzzle by machine learning tasks. The
goal is to re-purpose the wasted computational power to
build a decentralized system for crowd-sourcing machine
learning models. In their approach, nodes are classified into
suppliers, trainers, and validators. Supplier nodes publish
machine learning tasks and provide the training and test-
ing data, whereas trainers perform the training work in
an attempt to win the block. Validator nodes, which are
chosen randomly, are responsible for ranking the published
machine learning models based on their performance, then
pick the best as proof of the work. By design, the models,
testing, and training data are all public and the scheme does
not provide any confidentiality guarantees, which makes
the usability of such an approach questionable. In order to
preserve the privacy of both training and testing data, Qu et
al. [16] have considered the use of federated learning. This
enabled crowd-sourcing the workload required to train a
model while using miner’s local training data. Furthermore,
the verification of the model’s accuracy is done using a Ho-
momorphic encryption-based verification scheme to prevent
the disclosure of testing data to the network.
Daian et al. [17] have proposed outsourcing PoW to
defeat several frequent cyberattacks such as spam emails
and DDoS to recycle the inevitable wasted power. This
can be achieved by utilizing the difficulty of solving the
3cryptographic problem as a challenge for the clients in order
to benefit from a service. The mining process is decomposed
into two parts, namely, inner and outer puzzles. The inner
puzzles are solved by the service clients named workers that
provide solutions to the outsourcer to be verified. The outer
puzzle process the solutions provided by the workers in
order to find the overall solution of the PoW. Consequently,
the cost of solving the inner puzzle controls the number
of requests that can be submitted by the client in a short
period of time. Implementing outsourced PoW in practice is
restricted by the resources used at the client’s infrastructure
(e.g. PCs, mobile phones). As lightweight clients will not
be capable of solving the puzzle as fast as other power-full
machines, this may delay or prevent them from reaching the
service. Such a concern hinders the fairness of the network
and obstructs the reliability of the service.
One prominent work that modified the consensus pro-
tocol to optimize PoW is Bitcoin-NG [18]. Bitcoin-NG al-
tered the conventional PoW consensus by segregating the
election of a block creator from processing transactions.
This necessitates dividing Bitcoin’s block structure into two
new types, key blocks for electing a leader for the next
epoch, and micro blocks generated by the epoch’s leader
and consist of network’s transactions. This change in design
led to faster transaction validation as micro blocks do not
require including proof of work, alongside to faster key
block propagation due to its small size, which consequently
reduced the wasted energy caused by chain forks. How-
ever, Bitcoin-NG suffers from frequent micro block forks
that occur whenever a new leader is elected for the new
epoch because the current leader will carry on generating
micro blocks and propagate it to the network while being
unaware that another miner already solved a new key
block and started generating micro blocks simultaneously.
This behavior makes the network susceptible to fork-related
attacks, e.g., double-spending. To mitigate this issue, the
authors have proposed a new type of transaction that can be
issued by nodes that witnessed two conflicting transactions
to report an attempt of double spending and motivate the
investigation of the fraudulent miner rewarding. Yet, if the
double-spending attack is not noticed during the maturity
window of the attacker key block or before the attacker
spent the revenue, the double spending will indeed occur
and the involved leader will not be penalized. Based on
the aforementioned concern we can conclude that although
Bitcoin-NG is an enhanced version of Bitcoin in terms of
transaction throughput and energy optimization, it has di-
minished the level of security offered by the original Bitcoin
protocol.
In summary, the surveyed studies fall short in effec-
tively addressing the power consumption of PoW. Existing
approaches either replace the crypto-puzzle with different
types of useful work which adds complexity to the consen-
sus process or alter the ledger’s structure and consensus
flow drastically, which degrades the network’s security.
Green-PoW opts to avoid these shortcomings by achieving
dramatic energy reduction while sustaining the security
properties of the PoW based consensus methodology.
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Fig. 1: The state diagram of a miner in the original PoW.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the two main core components
of Bitcoin blockchain, namely, the block mining process and
difficulty adjustment. In addition, we discuss the security
concerns about the fundamental design.
3.1 Proof-of-Work
3.1.1 Block mining
In Bitcoin, miners participate in a PoW based consensus
in order to maintain the consistency and integrity of a
public distributed ledger, which is an ever-growing chain
of a tamper-proof data structure called blocks. Each block
records a list of transactions, previous block hash, Merkle
root, timestamp, hash target, and a nonce. Blocks are
chained by storing the hash of the predecessor block in the
current block header. Miners participate in an incentivized
race to forge a new valid block, by following a brute force
approach to find a 32-bit nonce value that yields a block hash
less than the target, which is derived from an adjustable
value called mining difficulty, used to maintain the equi-
librium between the block generation rate and the invested
computational power over-time [1] (more details in section
3.1.2).
The mining process in the original PoW is illustrated in
Fig. 1. When the mining race begins, miners start competing
for forming a valid block; the first miner that finds the
nonce is considered as the leader of the current round for
creating the new block. Such a miner announces the block
to the rest of the network to get rewarded with a newly
generated Bitcoins. Every other miner that receives the new
block generated by the winning miner immediately desists
mining the current block and start mining the next one.
3.1.2 Mining difficulty
Mining difficulty (D) is a measure of how difficult it is to
find a Nonce of a valid block. It is reevaluated every two
weeks based on the average block time of the previous 2016
blocks, to maintain a fixed block generation time (10 minutes
in Bitcoin) [1]. The difficulty will increase when the average
block time is less than the expected, as it indicates that the
network’s computational power has increased and miners
have become capable of generating new blocks in less than
10 minutes. Sometimes the network experiences a plummet
in the total computational power when a set of miners with
a significant hashing capability depart the network thus, the
mining difficulty will decrease. Equation (1) and (2) shows
4the relation between the previous average block time and
the difficulty level, where F is the factor used to recalculate
the difficulty of the next two weeks. It represents the ratio
of the expected average block time of the network TE to the
actual recorded average block time TAvg .
Based on how the difficulty adjustment works, Bitcoin
pushes miners to invest in more powerful mining rigs, to
be qualified for competing with other miners under the
incriminating mining difficulty. Despite the operation cost,
miners continue to spend more because of the expected
remuneration when winning the mining race. This feature
makes PoW based blockchain a power-hungry system that
burns energy indefinitely as long as the network of miners
is growing.
F =
TE
TAvg
(1)
D(i+1) = D(i) × F (2)
3.1.3 Chain forks
Blockchain may witness inconsistencies that cause branch-
ing in the chain, this phenomenon is called forks, where
more than one valid block is broadcasted to the network si-
multaneously [19]. Consequently, nodes get confused when
updating the chain and each will end up adopting different
blocks as the chain head. Network propagation delays are
mostly the reason for fork occurrence, which has been vali-
dated empirically in [19], [20]. Other factors also play a role
in causing forks such as the time needed to generate a block,
network bandwidth, and the number of connections each
node establisheswith the network. Blockchain nodes resolve
a fork in the next block period by adopting the longest chain,
which is identified by calculating the cumulative number of
expected hashes performed to generate each block in the
chain. The frequent occurrence of forks allows adversaries
to conduct various attacks (discussed further in section 5)
that could degrade the security of the blockchain network.
4 ENERGY-EFFICIENT CONSENSUS ALGORITHM
Green-PoW is an energy-efficient consensus algorithm that
reduces the computation load to nearly 50% compared to
the original Bitcoin’s PoW algorithm, without affecting the
other properties of the system. The algorithm divides time
into epochs, where each epoch consists of two consecutive
mining rounds. Let τi denote the epoch of time correspond-
ing to the creation of blocks number 2i and 2i+1, and ρ1i and
ρ2i denote the first and second mining round, respectively,
within the epoch τi. During ρ
1
i , the mining process to create
a new block follows the same Bitcoin mining steps, where
the set of all miners, which is denoted asM, can participate.
In addition, a very small subset of miners, denoted asM2i ,
is elected during this same mining round to be the only eli-
gible participants for mining the next block in ρ2i . Note that
M1i , which refers to the set of miners that can participate in
ρ1i , is equal toM and both are used interchangeably. All the
other minersM\M2i , during ρ
2
i , pause until the considered
block gets appended before starting a new mining epoch
(τi+1). An illustrative example of the mining process during
one epoch of time is given in Fig. 2. The detailed description
of each step of the algorithm is given in the remaining of this
section.
Algorithm 1 Green-PoW Consensus Algorithm.
1: init :
b = 1; ρ = 1 {b : block number, b : ρ : round}
runnerUp = false {I am a runner-up}
2: loop
3: if ρ == 1 then
4: nonce =FindBlockNonce(b)
5: if nonce then
6: {nonce found}
7: AppendNewBlock(b)
8: AnnounceBlock(b)
9: b = b+ 1
10: ρ = 2 {Enter power-save mode}
11: else
12: if ValidBlockReceived(b) then
13: AppendNewBlock(b)
14: b = b+ 1
15: ρ = 2
16: ContinueFindBlockNonce(b)
17: if nonce then
18: runnerUp = true
19: AnnounceRunnerUpBlock(b)
20: else
21: if RunnerUpBlockReceived(b) then
22: AbortMining(b) {Enter power-save
mode}
23: end if
24: end if
25: end if
26: end if
27: else
28: {second round: ρ = 2}
29: if runnerUp then
30: nonce =FindBlockNonce(b)
31: if nonce then
32: AppendNewBlock(b)
33: AnnounceBlock(b)
34: else
35: if ValidBlockReceived(b) then
36: AppendNewBlock(b)
37: AbortMining(b)
38: end if
39: end if
40: b = b+ 1
41: ρ = 1
42: runnerUp = false
43: else
44: {not a runner-up}
45: if ValidBlockReceived(b) then
46: AppendNewBlock(b)
47: b = b+ 1
48: ρ = 1 {Exit power-save mode}
49: end if
50: end if
51: end if
52: end loop
50 1 2 3 4
(a) First mining round ρ12.
0 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Second mining round ρ22.
Fig. 2: Illustrating the mining process of Green-PoW in one epoch of time (τ2). The blue node is the winner of the first
round (ω2) and generates the block number 4 (blue square). Red nodes are losing participants in the mining. The dashed
blue nodes are second place winners (M22), which will be the only nodes to handle the block in the next round (ρ
2
2). The
green node is the winner of the second round which generates block number 5 (green square). Gray nodes are idle miners
that do not participate in the mining during the second round {M \M22}.
4.1 Runner(s)-up Election
In the original PoW, when a puzzle-related block is solved
by some miner, all the other network nodes desist the
mining of that block and immediately start mining the next
block. In Green-PoW, if a valid block is found and the
first place winner is elected, the race will continue between
miners to also determine the runner-up, i.e., the node that
has the second place in the same block race. We denote by ωi
the first place winner, and ri the runner-up. Such runner-up
(ri) will be the only eligible node to mine in ρ
2
i , and all the
other nodes enter in mining-save mode until the end of ρ2i . As
illustrated in Fig. 3, when a miner mj receives a block from
the first place winner it continues the mining of the same
block. Minermj either (1) finds the nonce before receiving a
block from another miner claiming the second place; in this
case node mj will broadcast an announcement to the entire
network that it is the runner-up, and then immediately starts
the mining of the next block, or (2) receives a block from
another node mk and subsequently, adds it to its runners-
up list (M2i ) and then enters the mining-save mode for one
round. M2i serves in the second round to make sure that
any received block is originated from a valid runner-up.
Because of the distributed and asynchronous nature of
the network, it is possible to have multiple nodes that
consider themselves as runners-up when they find the block
at nearly the same time. A similar situation can happen
for the first place winner and leads to network fork that
is solved later by the longest chain rule [19]. For the runner-
up election, this situation will not cause any problem as
any node that successfully mines the block in the first
round will be considered as a potential runner-up and can
participate in the mining race during ρ2i . In this case, the
set of multiple runners-upM2i = {r
1
i , r
2
i , ..., r
l
i}. It is worth
noting that having multiple nodes as second-place winners
does not affect the system inconsistency, but on the contrary,
it improves system liveness as it increases the chance that a
block gets mined during the second round.
Fig. 3 illustrates a simplified case where a miner will
automatically switch to mining-save mode if it receives a
block from another node claiming the second place. Algo-
rithm 1 also summarizes the different steps of Green-PoW
consensus algorithm executed by nodes during mining. As
illustrated in Fig. 3 and Algorithm 1, a miner can be in one
of the following four mining states; 1) mining a block to win
the first place in ρ1, (2) continuing mining a block to win the
second place in ρ1, (3) mining a block to win the first place
in ρ2, or (4) mining-save mode.
In order to engage a sufficient number of participants in
ρ2i and improve the system liveness, in Green-PoW, even if
one node has already claimed to be a runner-up, the other
nodes can still continue mining. The decision of a node
to continue mining the first round’s block depends on the
probability of winning the race in ρ2i . A miner that solves
the first round’s block very late, will have a very small
chance to win as the others have started the mining earlier.
For the sake of simplicity, when a node receives the first
announcement of a runner-up, it continues mining for only a
very short period of time η with the hope of quickly finding
the nonce and joining ρ2i . The value of η is subject to liveness
and energy trade-off and is expected to be determined based
on the rate of block generation in the network. In the next
section, we will introduce another liveness parameter and
will elaborate more on how η could be tuned.
4.2 Second Round Timeout
Since only nodes that successfully mine the first round block
may be part of M2i , the number of potential miners in ρ
2
i ,
i.e., |M2i |, is naturally limited. While this is advantageous
from an energy conservation point of view, it is possible that
the system goes to a deadlock and the next block does not
get generated. This can happen for instance if miners inM2i
are isolated from the rest of the network, inadvertent in case
of network segmentation, or intentionally by an adversary
who launches an eclipse attack [21]. Tomitigate this problem
and ensure system liveness, Green-PoW employs a time-out
at the beginning of each ρ2i . The time-out should be greater
than the average time needed to generate a new block. If
a block announcement is not received before the time-out,
inactive nodes quit the mining-save mode and start immedi-
ately ρ2i . However, because of the asynchronous nature of
the network and the malicious behavior of some nodes, the
introduction of time-out may lead to some special cases that
we discuss in the following:
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Fig. 3: The state diagram of a miner in Green-PoW.
• A malicious node that is not eligible to participate
in ρ2i , may try to start the mining before the time-
out in order to get an advantage (receive a reward)
over other non-participating nodes. However, this is
very risky for the attacker as the success of such
manipulation depends on the probability that no
block will be received from eligible nodes (M2i ); in
such a case the attacker could be wasting a lot of
energy if it does not win.
• Due to network asynchronicity, it is possible that
some nodes will receive a valid block from an honest
ineligible participant while their time-out is not yet
ended. In this situation, these nodes will initially
reject the block, but because the majority will accept
it, the block will appear in the longest chain and the
minority will end up accepting it.
It is worth noting that both the time-out and η help
in defining a good balance between system liveness and
energy-efficiency. Growing η improves system liveness by
increasing |M2i |, yet it diminishes energy-efficiency as more
miners will participate in ρ2i . By using the time-out, Green-
PoW can ensure liveness, but it may also increase the energy
consumption if |M2i | is very small, i.e., η is very short, as
timing-out ρ2i is likely to happen frequently. Therefore, a
careful selection of η is crucial for Green-PoW to ensure
the desired energy-efficiency. More hints about the typical
choice of the time-out and η parameters are given in Section
6.
4.3 Second Round Mining Difficulty
As presented in Section 3.1.2, given that the total mining
power of the network can change over time, the mining
difficulty is dynamically adjusted to ensure that blocks are
generated at a nearly constant rate. In Green-PoW, because
the total hash power decreases drastically in each second
round mining, compared to the first round, a new difficulty
level defined specifically for the second round is required.
LetD1 andD2 denote the difficulty level to consider during
ρ1 and ρ2, respectively. A block is considered as valid only
if its hash value respects the target hash (e.g., in the block
header), which is calculated based on the difficulty level
of the corresponding mining round. The difficulty level is
initially set to the minimum value and updated every T
period of time (every 2 weeks in Bitcoin). Using equation
(1) and (2) presented in Section 3.1.2, the new difficultiesD1j
and D2j for the j
th Tj period can be calculated as follow:
D1j = D
1
j−1
(
TE
TAvg1
)
(3)
D2j = D
2
j−1
(
TE
TAvg2
)
(4)
Where TE is the expected average block time (10 minutes
in Bitcoin), and TAvg1 and TAvg2 are the actual average
block-time calculated over the last Tj , for blocks generated
in ρ1 and ρ2, respectively. Note that because it may happen
that some blocks in the second round are generated with
the participation of all network miners, in case of timing
out, these blocks will be considered for the adjustment of
7D1 but not D2. To distinguish between blocks generated
using a small subset of miners from those using all network
miners, the target value in the header of each block will be
verified.
The mining in ρ2 is similar to the mining in the original
PoW with the exception that only miners in the correspond-
ingM2 can participate, and use the second mining difficulty
D2. When a valid block is formed and propagated to the
entire network, as shown in Fig. 3, the other active miners
in M2 stop the mining of the current block and start new
mining epoch. The passive miners (M\M2) also leave their
mining-save mode and join the others in a new epoch.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
5.1 Transaction Censorship
The potential of transaction censorship exists in public
blockchains because of the limited size of the block and
the asynchronous nature of the network, which makes it
difficult to verify which set of transactions a particular block
must include [18], [22]. Usually, miners select only a subset
of transactions from their pool of pending transactions
to not exceed the block-size limit and tend to prioritize
transactions with higher fees to maximize their profit. Such
freedom on selecting transactions to include in a block
gives adversary miners the opportunity to censor some
transactions from being added to the next block, even those
with high fees.
By design, PoW extenuates this concern because the cen-
sorship time tc is bounded by the average block generation
time 1/λ, and restricted by the fact that a malicious miner
mc must be the winner. However, a powerful attacker that
may successfully mine and win k consecutive blocks will
delay the inclusion of some urgent transactions for a longer
time, i.e., tc = k/λ. In Green-PoW, a malicious miner mc
can still censor transactions for tc during ρ
1, yet because
the winner miner in ρ1 cannot participate in ρ2, the effect
of such an attack is limited to only one mining round.
As a result, Green-PoW can reduce the censorship time to
nearly 50%, which guarantees users better transaction time
and reduces the intensity of a potential denial of service
attack launched by powerful miners. The only case when
a winner in ρ1 can also participate and win in ρ2, is after
timing out ρ2. However, this can only happen under specific
conditions, such as separating the set M2 from the rest
of the network, which is difficult to be controlled by an
attacker.
5.2 Mining Centralization
In PoW-based networks, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, the
mining power is concentrated among a relatively small
number of miners (pools) which makes the crypto-system
highly susceptible to censorship or even 51% attacks [23].
Less powerful miners are usually unfortunate to generate a
new valid block in the presence of other superior miners.
This will eventually lead to a monopoly based system,
where a small percentage of the network earns the highest
rewarding shares. By design, Green-PoW can reduce the
monopoly of powerful miners, since generating consecutive
blocks by the same miner is likely not possible. A miner that
wins the mining race in ρ1 is not allowed to participate in ρ2,
and consequently gives the other nodes the chance to win
with less competition. The only case when it is still possible
that a winner in ρ1 also wins in ρ2, is after timing out ρ2.
To better illustrate the impact of Green-PoW on mining
shares distribution, we have imported the latest 7437 blocks
(50 days) from the Ethereummain network. We plot in Fig. 4
the corresponding shares of each miner as the ratio of its
mined blocks relative to the total block count, i.e., 7437. In
the same plot, we also include the corresponding shares of
each miner when applying Green-PoW to the same blocks.
In Green-PoW, two, three, four, or more consecutive blocks
are highly improbable to be mined by the same miner. It is
worth mentioning that two consecutive blocks could be gen-
erated by the same miner under a special condition, where
a miner wins the second round block and the next block
in the first round of the following epoch. For this reason,
we subtracted one block from only 50% of two consecutive
blocks cases. As shown in Fig. 4, the corresponding shares
of the most powerful miners, i.e., miner numbers 28 and
29, in Green-PoW are reduced, compared to the case of the
original PoW. Such an impact limits the dominance that
the most powerful miners may have on the network. For
example, the most powerful miner had a 5% reduction in
its share, which is redistributed among other nodes. The
reduction can be more significant if the computing power
varies widely among the nodes. Subsequently, better share
distribution between miners could be achieved.
5.3 Fork Occurrences
As discussed in Section 3.1.3, a fork in blockchain can
happen when multiple miners find a block almost simulta-
neously. More generally, a fork occurs whenever a minermj
finds a block while another miner mi has already formed a
valid block without being aware of it. This situation is likely
to occur in a large network having a long propagation delay.
To illustrate the effect of propagation delay on the fork
occurrences, Decker and Wattenhofer [24] have conducted
a theoretical study and presented an approximate model
to predict the rate at which forks can occur. For a newly
found block bi bymi, the probability of fork occurrence, i.e.,
conflicting blocks will be found by other miners before being
aware of bi, is estimated by (i) determining the number of
unaware miners at time t, and (ii) the probability that each
unawareminer will find a conflicting block during that time.
Given a ratio of unaware miners u(t) about bi during time
t, the probability of having a fork (F ) on the network can be
expressed as follow:
Pr[F > 0] = 1− (1− Pb)
∫
∞
0
u(t) dt (5)
Where Pb is the probability of a block being found by the
network at a given time t. From the formula, it is clear that
the fork rate is proportional to the ratio of unaware miners
and thus proportional to the total number of miners in the
network.
In Green-PoW, during the second round, the ratio of
active miners is very small compared to the first round.
Subsequently, the ratio of unaware miners u is also very
small.
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Fig. 4: Shares of miners in Ethereum Vs. Green-PoW based Ethereum, calculated using real data of the latest 7438 blocks
imported from the main Ethereum network.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the power consumption of
Green-PoW using stochastic analysis. As modeled in the
Bitcoin white paper [1] and in [25], [26], [27], the Bitcoin
mining process could be well-approximated as a Poisson
process with a deterministic rate λ which represents the
mining rate or the average time between block-arrival events.
In the following, we first formulate the mining process in
both PoW and Green-PoW as a Poisson process and then
assess the power saving achieved by Green-PoW.
6.1 Average Power Saving in Green-PoW
Let M denote the set of n miners in the network M =
{m1,m2, ...,mn}. Each miner mi ∈ M has a fraction hi
of the total hashing power in the network P , so that it
mines a new block at a rate of hiλ, where
∑
hi = 1. As
explained in Section 3.1.2, the difficulty of finding a block
is dynamically adjusted to ensure that a block is generated
every 1/λ seconds in expectation with a rate λ (λ = 1/600 in
Bitcoin). The inter-arrival times of consecutive blocks follow
Exponential distribution with the same rate parameter λ,
whose cumulative distribution function is:
Pr[T ≤ t] = 1− e−λt (6)
In PoW, each miner mi spends on average 1/λ and con-
sumes energy Ei which is proportional to its hashing power
hi and can be expressed as:
Ei =
1
λ
hi P (7)
Therefore, the average total energy E consumed by the
network to generate a block is inversely proportional to the
block generation rate λ:
E = P
1
λ
n∑
i=1
hi = P
1
λ
(8)
In Green-PoW, a block is either generated during the first
or the second round. In the first round, compared to PoW
mining, additional energy is consumed in order to select
the second-place winners. This additional energy depends
on the number of second-place winners and the time they
need to complete the mining and form a valid block. As-
suming thatmf is the first winner,ms,ms+1, ...,ms+k are k
runners-up, and ts, ts+1, ..., ts+k the respective time needed
by each of the runner-up to find the block. Thus the average
total energy E1st consumed by the network during the first
round can be expressed as follow:
E1st = P

 1
λ
+
k∑
i=s
ti(1− hf +
k−1∑
j=i−1
hj)

 , (9)
where hs−1 = 0
In the second round, the average consumed energy is pro-
portional to the time needed to generate a block (1/λ) and
the total hashing power of the runners-up. For simplicity,
we do not consider the scenario where the set of runners-up
fail to generate a block, and other miners start the mining
process after the timeout:
E2nd = P
1
λ
k∑
i=s
hi (10)
From equations (8), (9) and (10), the power saving in Green-
PoW can be, therefore, expressed as follow:
Esave = 2 E− (E1st + E2nd) (11)
6.2 Experimental Setup
In order to determine the time needed to select k runners-
up and thus, calculate the energy spent in the first and the
second round, we basically used the inverse function of the
CDF in equation (6) and feed it different probability values
p from a Uniform(0, 1) distribution to generate the blocks
inter-arrival times t:
t = −
1
λ
log (1− p) (12)
9The time when a runner-up finds a valid block, during the
first round, can be estimated as follow:
t = −
1
λ(1− hprev)
log (1− p) (13)
where hprev is the sum of the hashing power of all its
predecessor runners-up including the first winner of the
round. The time t is increasing for every newer runner-up as
the ratio of the total network power is decreasing (1−hprev).
We conduct extensive simulation and average the power
saving in Green-PoW over 100, 000 blocks. We consider
three network sizes with 100, 200, and 300 miners, and
different hashing power using Uniform and Normal distri-
bution. Table 1 summarises the simulation parameters used
to assess power saving.
Parameter Value
# blocks 100, 000
# miners [100, 200, 300]
# second winners [1, 2, ...,10]
Hashing power dist. % of miners having 50% of total hash power
[2%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 50%]
TABLE 1: Simulation Parameters
6.3 Results
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the impact of the number of runners-
up and the size of the network on the total energy con-
sumption in Green-PoW. Fig. 5 illustrates the ratio of power
saving in Green-PoW with respect to the original PoW
when varying the number of second round contenders for
different network sizes. When only one node mines the
block in the second round, the saving power is nearly 50%
regardless of the size of the network. However, for a larger
number of winners, the saving drop to nearly 32%, 41%, and
44% for networks of 100, 200, and 300 nodes, respectively.
We also evaluate the total energy consumption in PoW and
Green-PoW during the first and the second round and plot
the results in Fig. 6. For a network of 100 miners, as shown
in the figure, in Green-PoW the energy consumption during
the second round is nearly 10% of that of the first round;
such dramatic energy saving is due to the fact that only
few nodes are participating in the mining process during
the second round. In PoW, the average energy consumption
is almost constant and is 8-10 times more than the second
round of Green-PoW. Green-PoW consumes more energy
than PoW in the first round since the nodes continue min-
ing the same block in order to determine the runners-up.
Nonetheless, the average of the first and second rounds is
about 30-50% less than PoW.
We also assess in Fig. 7 the impact of a different distri-
bution of the hashing power on the energy-saving in Green-
PoW. We consider a network of 200 miners and engage 5
nodes to mine in ρ2. We distribute the hashing power among
network miners by varying the percentage of miners that
hold 50% of the total network hash power, while assuming
the remaining power is equally distributed among the other
50% of the network. When 50% of the network, i.e., 100
miners, equally hold 50% of the hashing power, this means
that all miners have exactly the same portion of hashing
power (0.5%). As illustrated in the figure, when a small
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
30
35
40
45
50
# second round miners
E
n
er
g
y
sa
v
in
g
(%
)
100 miners
200 miners
300 miners
Fig. 5: Energy saving ratio Vs. number of second round
miners
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
5
10
15
# second round miners
N
o
rm
al
iz
ed
en
er
g
y
co
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
.
(E
/
P
)
1st round
2nd round
PoW
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second round miners
portion of miners (2%) holds most of the hashing power
(50%), the energy-saving in Green-PoW is minimal, how-
ever, when the power is equally distributed among miners,
Green-PoW achieves its maximal saving. This is mainly due
to the fact that the energy-saving in Green-PoW depends on
the mining power of the second round contenders. When
some of them have high power, per equation (4) the mining
difficulty will be increased and consequently, more energy
needs to be spent in order to find the second round block.
Vise versa, when they have small hashing power, less energy
will be consumed in order to find the block in the second
round as the mining difficulty will be reduced.
6.4 Time-out and η Selection
As we discussed in Section 4, the time-out and η are two
important parameters that help in striking a good balance
between system liveness and energy-efficiency. The η pa-
rameter defines the additional time a particular node needs
to spend in mining during ρ1i after hearing from the first
considered runner-up. This time can be set as a function of
the number of miners that we want to have in the second
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Fig. 7: Energy saving ratio Vs. hash-power distribution
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runner-up to be include inM2i .
round, i.e., a function of |M2i |. To capture the effect of η,
we plot in Fig. 8 the time needed in order to have a specific
size of M2i . We consider the same simulation parameters
as before, and we plot the time between the first and last
considered runner-up, when having, 3, 5, 10 15, and 20
miners in the second round. We also consider different
distributions of the hashing power in the network. In the
case of uniformly distributed hash power among miners,
the value of η does not increase much with the number of
second round miners; however, when the distribution is not
uniform, specifically, when 50% of the power is held by only
5% of the miners, η increases significantly. This is because
more time is needed to wait for less-powerful nodes to mine
a block and be able to join other miners in ρ2i .
We also plot in Fig. 9 the required time for a block to be
mined in the second round. As discussed previously, the
inter block generation (mining) time follows Exponential
distribution with the same rate parameter λ (1/600 in Bit-
coin). Using equation (13) we plot the mining time between
two consecutive blocks (time between the first round block
and second round block) for different probability. A safe
time-out can be chosen as the duration of time ensuring
that a block will be mined with a high probability. For
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Fig. 9: Time to wait for a block to be mined in the second
round Vs. the corresponding probability.
instance, for a block to be mined with a probability between
[0.7, 0.9] a network needs to wait for a time between [12,
23] minutes. Therefore, a typical time-out can be chosen
from this interval. Note that having different hash power
distribution will not affect the block generation time, as the
defined difficulty D2i in equation (4) ensures that a block
is mined at a constant rate on the average (10 minutes in
Bitcoin).
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel and energy-
efficient consensus algorithm, called Green-PoW, for a pub-
lic blockchain. In our algorithm, the overall energy con-
sumption during mining is reduced by up to 50% compared
to the original PoW. Green-PoW achieves its goal by taking
advantage of the energy spent during one block mining to
also elect a small number of miners that will exclusively
mine the next block. In Green-PoW, time is divided into
epochs that consist of two mining rounds. The first round
is similar to mining in the original PoW with the exception
that a small additional power is spent in order to qualify
a subset of miners to exclusively contend in the second
round. In the second round, where most of the mining
power is saved, only the elected miners during the previous
round have the right to participate and compete for forming
a new block. To validate the performance of Green-PoW,
extensive simulations have been conducted to mainly assess
the energy saving compared to the original PoW. The results
demonstrated the efficiency of the solution where up to 50%
of the mining energy can be saved for a large network with
equally distributed hashing power. We also have studied
key security properties and shown the advantage of Green-
PoW in reducing fork occurrences, the effect of censorship
attack, and mining centralization.
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